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CONFINE IS FINE: HAVE THE NON-DANGEROUS MENTALLY
ILL LOST THEIR RIGHT TO LIBERTY? AN EMPIRICAL STUDY
TO UNRAVEL THE PSYCHIATRIST'S CRYSTAL BALL

Donald H. Stone, J.D:
ABSTRACT

This Article will examine the reverse trend in civil commitment laws in
the wake of recent tragedies and discuss the effect of broader civil
commitment standards on the care and treatment of the mentally ill. The
2007 Virginia Tech shooting, the 2011 shooting of Congresswoman
Giffords, and the 2012 Aurora movie theatre shooting have spurred
fierce debates about the dangerousness of mentally ill and serve as
cautionary tale about what happens when warning signs go unnoticed
and opportunities for early intervention missed. This piece will explore
the misconception about the role medication and inpatient civil
commitments should play in prevention of dangerousness and undermine
the belief that we can medicate away the needs of the mentally ill. The
adverse effect civil commitments can have on individuals' long-term
recovery, future employment prospects and overall mental, physical,
emotional and economic stability can be far-reaching; so minimum due
process protections must be carefully guarded. The contention is that
civil commitment decisions should be based on concrete evidence that
the individual is an imminent danger to self or others and not on a
psychiatrists' speculation about future deterioration absent coerced
treatment. Statistical data, collected from a survey of 100 psychiatrists,
will be examined to determine what is most significant to psychiatrists in
commitment decisions and highlight the impact state standards and types
of hospital facilities have on psychiatrists' testimony at civil commitment
proceedings. Finally, this Article will outline how "need for treatment"
and "grave disability" provisions in commitment standards have
stripped away due process protections for the mentally ill and discuss
ways mental health advocates can fight back to reverse this troubling
movement in commitment laws .

• © 2011 Donald H. Stone. Donald H. Stone, Professor of Law, University of
Baltimore School of Law, B.A., Rutgers University; J.D., Temple University
School of Law. Professor Stone gratefully acknowledges his research assistant,
Catherine Seward Jackson, a 2012 graduate of the University of Baltimore
School of Law, for her outstanding legal research in the preparation of this
Article.

324

Virginia Journal ofSocial Policy & the Law

[Vol. 20:2

CONTENTS

Abstract. ................................................................................................ 323
Introduction .......................................................................................... 324
I. Procedural Due Process Protections for Persons with Mental Illness326
A. Laying the Framework: Supreme Court Outlines Minimum Due
Process Protections ..................................................................... 326
B. Challenges to State Civil Commitment Standards: Individual
Challenges Met with Inconsistent Success ................................. 328
II. Role of Medication Nonadherence on Civil Commitment
Decisions ......................................................................................... 331
III. Challenges to Predicting Dangerousness: Statistical Review and
Analysis of Psychiatrists' Recommendations in Civil Commitment
Decisions ......................................................................................... 337
IV. Dangerous Trends in Civil Commitment Laws: Statistical
Analysis of Ease of Commitment and Length of Stay ..................... 348
A. Data Analysis of Trends in Commitment Laws and Length of
Stay of Civil Commitments ........................................................ 349
V. Recommendations ............................................................................ 354
Conclusion ............................................................................................ 355
Appendix A: Stone Survey ................................................................... 357

INTRODUCTION

In determining that a mentally ill person requires civil commitment
to an inpatient psychiatric hospital, how much discretion should judges
have? How much influence should uncontested psychiatrist expert
opinions have on the outcome? How imminent should danger to self or
others be? Will we permit legislatures and pro-treatment advocates to
stretch the civil commitment standard until all due process protections
are gone? What impact do more relaxed commitment standards have on
the level of care that patients with mental illness receive? Why should
disability advocates and members of the legal community alike be
alarmed by this regressive trend toward more permissive commitment?
There is a backlash among mental health advocates who are
questioning the long-term efficacy of psychiatric medication for the
treatment of persons with severe mental illness. Does a magic bullet
really exist to treat persons with mental illness? Might there be rational
and valid reasons for patients to refuse certain medication or treatment?
How we as a society respond, both through treating psychiatrists who
choose to institute commitment proceedings against patients with mental
illness under a "grave disability" or "need for treatment" standard and
the judges who are asked to make determinations at civil commitment
hearings, will speak volumes about the weight we give to the liberty
interests of individuals with mental illness.

Confine is Fine

Winter 2012]

325

In the late 1960s, there was broad consensus that the present
treatment of persons with mental illness was inhumane and in need of
change. There was a national push to deinstitutionalize people with
mental illness and increase community treatment resources. State and
federal courts, recognizing that civil commitment was a significant
curtailment of liberty interests, I established procedural limitations to the
previously unchallenged practice of committing mentally ill persons for
treatment purposes under parens patriae powers.2 Following landmark
Supreme Court decisions,3 most states adopted a stricter criterion for
civil commitment, requmng, at a Illimmum, a showing of
"dangerousness. "4
Unfortunately, several decades later the pendulum has swung in the
opposite direction. Legislatures, with the broad support of medical
community, 5 have moved to expand the definition of "dangerousness"
back to what it was prior to the 1960s. Only eight states still define
dangerousness solely as a "danger to self or others.,,6 Forty-two states
have criteria broader than dangerousness that usually include either a
"grave disability"? or "need for treatment"g provision. These expanded
criteria give judges broad discretion to make civil commitment decisions

I See, e.g., Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979); Jackson v. Indiana, 406
U.S. 715 (1972); Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504 (1972); In re Gault, 387 U.S.
1 (1967); Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967).
2 R. Michael Bagby & Leslie Atkinson, The Effects of Legislative Reform on
Civil Commitment Admission Rates: A Critical AnalysiS, 6 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 45,
45-46 (1988).
3 Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979); O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S.
563 (1975); Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972).
4 Robert A.
Brooks, Psychiatrists' Opinions About Involuntary Civil
Commitment: Results of a National Survey, 35 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L.
219,219 (2007).
5 Id. at 224. In a national survey, completed by over 700 psychiatrists, 90% of
respondents wanted grave disability to be at least one of the grounds for civil
commitment. Fifty-two percent supported commitment standard based on
mental illness alone, an increase from only 10% supporting such grounds in
1969.

6

Improved

Treatment

Standards,

TREATMENT

ADVOCACY

CTR.,

http://www. treatmentadvocacycenter. orgi so Iuti onli mproved-treatment -standards
(last visited Dec. 3, 20 II).
? Id. (stating that grave disability provision is an additional criteria adopted in
most states that allows for commitment where a person because of their mental
illness is unable to care for their basic needs).
8Id. (stating that "need for treatment" provisions are a third criteria for civil
commitment based on either the person's inability to provide for needed
psychiatric care, inability to make an informed medical decision, or need for
intervention to prevent further psychiatric or emotional deterioration. Currently
twenty-six of the forty-two states with some sort of broader commitment criteria
have "need for treatment" language in their statutes).
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and overvalue the role of medication adherence in the treatment of
mental illness. These provisions allow for the commitment of nondangerous individuals based on a presumption that, if left untreated,
future harm will likely ensue.
Three recent tragedies, and the public discourse that followed, may
help to explain the reversal of long fought protections for people with
mental illnesses. The 2007 Virginia Tech shooting, the 2011 shooting of
Congresswoman Giffords, and the 2012 Aurora movie theatre shooting
were three very high profile cases in which the media focused its
discussions on the mental health of the shooters. There was a tumultuous
debate about the dangerousness of persons with mental illness when
warning signs go unnoticed and there is a lack of proactive intervention.
Following these tragedies, many state legislatures have moved to loosen
the requirements for civil commitment to make it easier to commit
persons with mental illness who may be dangerous in the future. 9
This Article will examine the regressive trend in civil commitment
laws and the effect of that trend on the care and treatment of persons
with mental illness. It will take a critical look at the presumption that
medication and inpatient hospitalization are effective means of
preventing dangerous behavior and examine whether psychiatrists'
predictions of future dangerousness should justify the curtailment of
persons' liberty when there is no clear evidence that serious physical
harm to the individual or to others is imminent.
This Article will examine statistical data from a survey of 100
psychiatrists in order to better understand what evidence is most
significant to psychiatrists in commitment recommendations and
highlight the impact of state standards and types of hospital facilities on
psychiatrists' testimony at civil commitment proceedings. 10
I. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS PROTECTIONS FOR PERSONS WITH
MENTAL ILLNESS

A. LAYING THE FRAMEWORK: SUPREME COURT OUTLINES MINIMUM DUE
PROCESS PROTECTIONS

Prior to the early 1970s, the civil commitment of persons with
mental illness went largely unchallenged in the courts. State courts
committed many people with mental illnesses under parens patriae
For example, in the wake of Virginia Tech shooting, Virginia changed statute
from requiring evidence of imminent danger to only a substantial likelihood
person would cause physical harm to self or others. VA. CODE ANN. § 37.2-808,
809 (West 20 II).
10 See infra Appendix A: Donald H. Stone, Involuntary Commitment Survey of
Psychiatrists (2011) [hereinafter Stone, Survey].

9
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powers, asserting that they were in need of treatment. II The Supreme
Court in Jackson v. Indiana extended due process protection to
respondents in civil commitment proceedings, mandating that there be a
reasonable relationship between the purpose of civil commitment and the
nature and duration of commitment. 12 The Court expanded these
protections in O'Connor v. Donaldson,13 restricting states' ability to
confine non-dangerous individuals who are capable of surviving safely
in freedom.14 The Court stated that the "mere presence of mental illness
does not disqualify a person from preferring his home to the comforts of
an institution."15 The Court held that the state's interest in providing care
to the unfortunate was not a sufficient justification to confine a person
with a mental illness against his will, even if it ensured him a higher
standard of living. 16
The Court elevated the burden of proof for civil commitments in
Addington v. Texas, requiring the state to prove by clear and convincing
evidence that the person is mentally ill, dangerous to either himself or
others, and in need of confined therapy.17 The Court explained that the
clear and convincing standard of evidence is a balance of the patient's
interest to not be involuntarily confined and the state's parens patriae
power to provide care for its citizens who are unable to care for
themselves. 18 The Court weighed heavily the liberty interests of
individuals to make independent treatment decisions and the stigma that
can result after a person has been committed to a mental hospital.I 9
Given the loss of liberty and the stigma of civil commitment, the Court
stated that the factfinder should commit an individual only on "a
showing that the individual suffers from something more serious than is
demonstrated by idiosyncratic behavior."20 The Court chose to increase
the burden of proof to stress to the factfinder the importance of the
decision and to reduce the likelihood that courts would order
inappropriate commitments. 21 These landmark decisions served as
guideposts for civil commitment laws across the country as states revised
their statutes to comply with the Court's holdings.

II Bagby & Atkinson, supra note 2, at 45.
12 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972).
13 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
fd. at 576.
15 fd. at 575.

14

16

fd.

17441 U.S. 418, 433 (1979).
18 fd. at 426-27.
19 Id. at 425-26.
20 Id. at 427.
21/d.
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B. CHALLENGES TO STATE CIVIL COMMITMENT STANDARDS: INDIVIDUAL
CHALLENGES MET WITH INCONSISTENT SUCCESS

Despite the protections outlined by the Supreme Court, the
disturbing trend seen in the "need for treatment" and "grave disability"
statutes permits confinement based on an expectation of deterioration
and possible future harm that is largely based on questionable
presumptions about persons with mental illness. These exceptions to the
requirement of dangerousness represent a complete erosion of the due
process rights articulated by the Court. 22
There is much disagreement among state courts about what is a
constitutionally permissible commitment standard. State courts have
interpreted minimum due process differently. The handling of challenges
made to "need for treatment" provisions in Alaska and Wisconsin
reflects that variance. Despite similarities in the content of the statutes,
the Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld the state's "need for treatment"
provlSlon, while the Alaska Supreme Court struck down its state's
prOVISIOn.
The Alaska Supreme Court, in Wetherhorn v. Alaska Psychiatric
Institute, explicitly adopted the 0 'Connor standard in holding that the
defmition of "gravely disabled" is constitutional only if narrowly
construed to require a level of incapacity so substantial that the
respondent is incapable of surviving safely in freedom.23 In Alaska, a
person was thought to be gravely disabled if, as a result of his or her
mental illness, the person was in danger as a result of the neglect of basic
needs or personal safety or would suffer severe or abnormal mental,
emotional, or physical distress if not treated. 24
The Wisconsin Supreme Court went the opposite direction in In re
Commitment of Dennis H,25 rejecting the idea that dangerousness must
be "based upon a finding of recent overt act, attempt or threat to do
substantial harm to oneself or another" and that there must remain an
immediate danger at the time of the hearing. 26 In Dennis H, the
Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed the constitutionality of a lower
standard for dangerousness.27 The challenged provision of Wisconsin's
involuntary commitment statute, dubbed the "fifth standard," allows for
the commitment of a person with mental illness who will "suffer severe
mental, emotional, or physical harm that will result in the loss of the
22 See O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575 (1975); see also Addington,
441 U.S.418.
23 156 PJd 371, 377-78 (Alaska 2007).
241d. at 376 (quoting ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.915(7)(2012)).
25
647 N.W.2d 851 (Wis. 2002).
26 Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1093 (E.D. Wis. 1972).
27 See Dennis H., 647 N. W.2d 851.
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individual's ability to function independently in the community or the
loss of cognitive or volitional control over his or her thoughts or actions"
if left untreated. 28 The Wisconsin Supreme Court held that even if there
is no foreseeable risk of self-injury or suicide, a person is still dangerous
if he or she is "helpless to avoid the hazards of freedom.,,29 To justify
involuntary commitment, the level of incapacity of the gravely disabled
person should be so substantial that the person is incapable of surviving
safely in freedom. 30
The addition of "need for treatment" provisions to civil commitment
laws reflects a troubling supposition that persons with mental illness
who are not on medication are inherently dangerous. The need for
treatment standard upheld by the court in In re Commitment ofDennis H.
should be unsettling to all advocates who subscribe to the belief that
substantive due process requires a showing of dangerousness by clear
and convincing evidence. Simply demonstrating that a person might
benefit from involuntary civil commitment should not justify the
deprivation of a person's freedom. New laws like those adopted and
upheld in Wisconsin, however, do just that, redefining dangerousness to
include "need for treatment" language.
Despite setbacks in some courts, there have been many victories for
disability advocates. 31 The Florida Appellate Court in Boller v. State held
that the commitment of a woman who refused to take her psychotropic
medication was unconstitutional. 32 The court followed the well-settled
rule that refusal to take medication, despite deteriorating mental
condition, does not justify involuntary commitment. 33 The court held that
that there must be clear and convincing evidence that, without treatment,
the patient would pose a real and present threat of substantial harm to
herself or that there is a substantial likelihood that in the near future she
will inflict serious bodily harm on herself or another, as evidenced by
recent behavior. 34 The requirement that the patient exhibit recent
dangerous behavior rather than simply refuse to take medication
establishes that the danger standard is fundamental and necessary to
comply with constitutional substantive due process requirements.
Speculation as to the significance of medication refusal should not be a
28Id. at 857 (quoting WIS. STAT. ANN. § 51.20 (West 2011)).
29Id. at 863 (quoting O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 574 n.9 (1975)).
30/d. at 862--63.
31 See State v. M.A.B., 157 P.3d 1256, 1259 (Or. Ct. App. 2007) (finding that the
refusal to take medication was not sufficient, by itself, to prove an inability to
provide for basic needs); see also State v. T.R.O., 145 P.3d 350, 353 (Or. Ct.
App. 2006) (holding that a particularized threat is necessary for involuntary
commitment).
32 775 So. 2d 408, 409 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
33Id.
34Id. at 409-10.
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component of the evaluation of a person's need for involuntary
hospitalization. Recent dangerous behavior should form the basis of
clear and convincing evidence of danger in commitment proceedings.
In a similar case, Carolyn Blue refused to take her medication and
faced civil commitment in Florida. 35 The court reversed the involuntary
commitment, holding that although her condition was deteriorating, the
evidence lacked the specificity needed to establish that there was a
substantial likelihood that in the near future she would inflict serious
bodily harm on herself or another person. 36 Mere speculation that a
person's refusal of medication will cause her to harm others was
insufficient to warrant involuntary commitment. 37 The requirement that
there be a substantial likelihood that in the near future the person with
mental illness will inflict bodily harm on herself or another person is
essential to adequately safeguard the right of patients with mental illness
to make independent treatment decisions.
In New Jersey, when a judge asked a psychiatrist what her basis was
for believing that the respondent, J.R., may stop taking his medication
and present a danger to others, the doctor could not provide any specific
incidents of assaultive behavior that occurred while the individual was
living without medication in the community.38 In another case, the
Appellate Division of the New Jersey Superior Court held that to justify
an involuntary commitment, it is necessary to show more than a potential
for dangerous conduct. 39 The court in In re Commitment of J.R. describes
"danger to self' by reason of mental illness as threatened or attempted
suicide or serious bodily harm or behavior that indicates that the person
is unable to satisfy his or her need for nourishment, essential medical
care, or shelter to such an extent that it is probable that substantial bodily
injury, serious physical debilitation, or death will result within the
reasonably foreseeable future. 40 The requirement of immediacy of the
danger, coupled with the substantial risk based on recent specific acts or
threats of dangerous behavior, should protect against medication refusal
being used as the primary justification for involuntary commitment.

35

See Blue v. State, 764 So. 2d 697, 698 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000).

36 Id.; see also Lyon y. State, 724 So. 2d. 1241, 1242 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999)
(requiring the specifying of self-neglect to establish real and present threat of
substantial harm to her well-being when patients were not on medication).
37 See Henson Y. State, 801 So. 2d 316, 317 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
38 See In re Commitment of J.R., 916 A.2d 463, 465 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Diy.
2007).
39 In re Commitment of Raymond S., 623 A.2d 2491 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Diy.
1993).
40 Commitment ofl.R., 916 A.2d at 467.
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II. ROLE OF MEDICATION NONADHERENCE ON CIVIL COMMITMENT
DECISIONS

Should the role of government expand to authorize and sanction the
involuntary confinement of a person with mental illness who articulates
a refusal to comply with a psychiatrist's order of medical treatment?
Does the rejection of a treatment plan that includes psychiatric
medication warrant an ambulance ride to the nearest psychiatric hospital
for evaluation and treatment? It appears that the "treatment" that many
psychiatrists provide starts and ends with recommending that patients
take pharmacological tablets. Whether a patient arrives at a psychiatric
hospital with a laundry list of prescribed medications and is assessed by
doctors as over-medicated, or he arrives in the refusal mode, without the
list of pills, screaming "you can't make me take those pills," the
evaluating psychiatrist's treatment plan at the admissions unit of the
hospital remains rather consistent: Let us replace those old, less effective
medications with some new and improved ones, or let us immediately
start the newly-admitted patient on a drug regimen and see what
happens.
One should not be surprised that psychiatrists use the wait-and-see
approach to bolster the purported need for continued hospitalization
when the civil commitment hearing day arrives. Psychiatrists commonly
tell judges at commitment hearings that the need to adjust medication
type and dosage justifies continued commitment. Continued confinement
is necessary, according to the testifying psychiatrist, to ensure the safety
of the patient. The hospital will invariably ask the judge to sign off on
the civil commitment order to permit the treating psychiatrist to "wait
and see." The patient will continue to be confined against his or her will
despite a lack of tangible evidence that the person poses a danger to
himself or herself or others in the community. Such a decision is based
on a misguided belief that only patients who are properly medicated are
no longer dangerous.
When a patient is involuntarily committed to a psychiatric hospital
based on non-compliance with medication, the patient faces the
possibility of being forced to take medication against his or her wil1. 41 It
is well established that a person may refuse other kinds of medical

See MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 1O-708(b) (West 2012) (stating that
medication may be administered to an individual who refuses the medication, in
an emergency, on the order of a physician where the individual presents a
danger to the life or safety of the individual or others; or in a nonemergency,
when the individual is hospitalized involuntarily or committed for treatment by
order of a court and the medication is approved by a panel under the provisions
of this section).

41
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treatment even if at risk of death.42 The state's interest in protecting a
person from harm to self is relatively low where the acts or omissions do
not cause injury.43 Despite this recognition, there is an odd assumption
that courts should treat forced medication for mental illness differently.
The assumption that an untreated person's mental condition will
decompensate without intervention until the individual eventually
becomes dangerous is highly speculative. It is possible that the
individual may not decompensate and will, like many individuals with
mental illness, recover even without ongoing treatment. 44
Confinement for the purpose of providing treatment, one could
argue, is a laudable purpose. However, if the reason for commitment is
the refusal of a person with mental illness to comply with a medication
regimen in the community, and confinement is for the purpose of
treatment, ergo medication, the purpose is without meaning. Without a
demonstration of imminent danger in the community, a person with
mental illness could be subject to involuntary confinement simply
because of a voluntary decision to refuse to take prescribed antipsychotropic medications. However, once the person is confined to a
hospital, such medication could not be forcibly provided without a
showing of dangerousness, and such a person could languish there
without treatment. 45
Where proponents of involuntary commitment based on need for
treatment maintain that coerced care is preferable to no care, the freedom
from physical confinement by the state where an individual poses no
danger to self or others is still the guiding constitutional principal for
states.46 States applying a need for treatment standard do so under the
guise that refusal of treatment will result in a person engaging in harmful

See Stamford Hospital v. Vega, 674 A.2d 821, 832 (Conn. 1996) (stating that a
patient's refusal of blood transfusions was in keeping with the deeply rooted
common law right of bodily integrity, and the hospital's interests in preserving
the patient's life and in protecting ethical integrity of medical profession were
insufficient to take priority over patient's rights); see also St. Mary's Hospital v.
Ramsey, 465 So. 2d 666, 667 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (upholding a patient's
constitutional right of privacy, freedom to choose and a right of selfdetermination in her decision to refuse a blood transfusion).
43 See In re Duran, 769 A.2d 497,503,504 (Pa. 2001).
44 See generally Andrew W. Kane, Essentials of Involuntary Civil Commitment
Assessment for Mental Illness, in ESSENTIALS OF FORENSIC PSYCHOLOGICAL
ASSESSMENT, 136, 136-64 (Marc J. Ackerman ed., 1999).
45 See Dep't of Health & Mental Hygiene v. Kelly, 918 A.2d 470,471-72 (Md.
2007) (holding in a forced medication case that the hospital must prove that the
patient presents a danger in the hospital if not medicated, not just in the
community were he to be released); see also Enis v. Dep't. of Health & Social
Servs.,962 F. Supp. 1192, 1194 (W.D. Wis. 1996).
46 See O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563,575-76 (1975).
42

Winter 2012]

Confine is Fine

333

conduct or being unable to provide for his basic physical needs. 47
However, the connection between mental illness and the need for
involuntary admission is attenuated and relies on several inferences
about the nature of mental illness, the role of psychotropic medication in
responding to mental illness, and the degree of dangerousness resulting
from medication noncompliance.
The Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration
(SAMHSA) examines mental health treatment in the United States. 48
SAMHSA's National Survey on Drug Use and Health (NSDUH) found
in 2008 that 58.7% of adults in the U.S. with a serious mental illness
received treatment for a mental health problem. 49 The type of mental
health services received ranged from prescription medication (11.1%)
and outpatient services (6.9%) to inpatient treatment (1%).50
There are several explanations for the fact that 5.5 million adults
with mental illness are not receiving treatment, including cost or
insurance issues (45.1 %), not feeling a need for treatment or thinking the
problem could be handled without treatment (40.6%), not knowing
where to go for service (22.9%), perceived stigma associated with
receiving treatment (22.8%), lack of time (18.1 %), belief that treatment
would not help (10.3%), and fear of being committed or having to take
medicine (7.2%).51

See 405 ILL. COMPo STAT. § 5/1-119 (2010). The Illinois commitment statute
states in pertinent part that a "person subject to involuntary admission on an
inpatient basis includes a person with mental illness who: refuses treatment or is
not adhering adequately to prescribed treatment; is unable to understand his or
her need for treatment; and if not treated on an inpatient basis, is reasonably
expected, after such deterioration, to meet the dangerous or gravely disabled
criteria. Id.
48 Use of Mental Health Services and Treatment Among Adults, NAT'L INST. OF
MENTAL HEALTH, http://www.nimh.nih.gov/statistics/3use_mCadult.shtml (last
visited May 27,2013).
49Id. In 2007 there were 24.3 million adults in the U.S. with serious
psychological distress. Results from the 2007 National Survey on Drug Use and
Health: National Findings, DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., SUBSTANCE
ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN., & OFFICE OF ApPLIED STUDIES
(Sept.
4,
2008),
http://www.oas.samhsa.gov/NSDUHl2k7NSDUHl2k7
results.cfm#Ch8.
50 Results from the 2007 National Survey on Drug Use and Health, supra note
49 (using 2007 data).
51 2003 National Survey on Drug Use & Health: Results, DEP'T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS., SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN., &
OFFICE OF ApPLIED STUDIES, (June 3, 2008), http://www.oas.samhsa.gov/nhsda!
2k3nsduhl2k3Results.htm#toc (using 2003 data). It is also noted that adults who
used illicit drugs in the past year were more than twice as likely to have a
serious mental illness as adults who did not use an illicit drug. Id.

47
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The reasons for medication noncompliance are complicated and
profound. Side effects of anti-psychotic and anti-depressants medications
are often severe and significant. Anti-psychotic medications can carry
serious side effects, including the following: myocarditis (fatal heart
condition), changes in cardiac electrical impulses, sedation,
agranulocytosis (decrease in white blood cells), diabetes, and serious
weight gain. 52 Other side effects include sexual dysfunction, suppression
of REM sleep, muscle tics, fatigue, emotional blunting, and apathy.53
Additionally, the risks and stigma associated with forced involuntary
treatment, including feelings of alienation, disaffection, adverse impact
on the therapeutic psychiatric-patient relationship, and loss of control
over one's life, often undercut the recovery process. 54
A study by Bolling & Kohlenberg of 161 outpatients with major
depressive disorder (MDD) who had completed a course of treatment
with a selective serotonin reuptake inhibitor (SSRI) antidepressant found
that one-fifth complained of "apathy," and one-fourth complained of
"loss of creativity."55 In addition, a significant population complained of
cognitive side effects, including "poor concentration" (17.4%), "loss of
ambition" (16.1 %), "memory loss" (13.0%), and "problem-solving
difficulties" (9.9%).56
In a long-term study of persons with major depressive disorder on
antidepressant therapies by Dr. Maurizio Fava of the Department of
Psychiatry, Depression, Clinical and Research Program at Massachusetts
General Hospital found that more than 30% of responders exhibit longterm cognitive symptoms of apathy, inattentiveness, forgetfulness, wordfinding difficulty, and mental slowing, and over 40% of the responders
experienced physical symptoms of fatigue and sleepiness/sedation. 57 Dr.
Maurizio Fava and his colleagues concluded from this data that the longterm symptoms of patients with major depressive disorder are both side

52

E. FULLER TORREY, SURVIVING SCHIZOPHRENIA: A MANUAL FOR FAMILIES,

PATIENTS, AND PROVIDERS 230-38 (2000).
53 ROBERT WHITAKER, ANATOMY OF

AN

EPIDEMIC:

MAGIC

BULLETS,

PSYCHIATRIC DRUGS, AND THE ASTONISHING RISE OF MENTAL ILLNESS IN
AMERICA

170 (2010).

54 Bruce J. Winick, Mandatory Treatment: An Examination of Therapeutic
Jurisprudence, 75 NEW DIRECTIONS FOR MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. 27, 30
(1997).
55 Maurizio Fava et aI., A Cross-Sectional Study of the Prevalence of Cognitive
and Physical Symptoms During Long-Term Antidepressant Treatment, 67 J. OF
CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 1754 (2006).
561d.
571d.
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effects of the antidepressants and the residual symptoms of the mental
illness. 58
Persons with mental illness sometimes also refuse medication
because they are in denial and taking medication would serve as an
admission that they do indeed have a highly stigmatized disorder that
can be long-lasting and disabling. 59 Resistance to medication may also
be a battle for autonomy and contro1. 60 Such individuals feel that their
lives have been so controlled by doctors, nurses, and families and that
controlling the intake of medications is the only power they have left. 61
Society places a stigma on mental illness and receiving medications for
one's mental illness is an acknowledgement of the illness, which carries
the stigma.
Even those persons with mental illness who willingly take their
medication may still have low levels of energy and are often plagued by
anxieties and depression, unable to hold a job, and forced to live life in
poverty.62 They "see no hope for love or marriage," and life may not
appear much better when they are on medication than when they are
Off.63

When a person with mental illness appears before a judge to
determine if involuntary civil commitment is necessary and appropriate,
what is the relevance of the refusal to take psychotropic medication,
standing alone, on the showing of danger to self or others? There is a
preference shown toward medication compliance, whereby patients
acknowledge their illness and recognize the benefits of medication; a
compliant attitude equates with cooperation and adjustment. However,
should noncompliance with medication equate with signs of danger,
permitting a judge to authorize involuntary commitment because the
indication is the patient lacks contact with reality, is unable to
acknowledge their illness, is unable to seek assistance, and thus poses a
danger to self or others?
In his masterful book, Anatomy of an Epidemic, Robert Whitaker
rails against the psychiatric and drug industry that has given rise to
mental illness in America. Whitaker challenges the deep-seated belief
that mental illness is a result of chemical imbalances in the brain and that
psychiatric medication can improve the patients' mental health. Whitaker
58/d. at 1757.

Agnes Hatfield, Medication Non-Compliance, SCHIZOPHRENIA.COM,
http://www.schizophrenia.comlnewsletter/997/997noncom.htm (last visited Dec.
11,2012).

59

60Id.
611d.
62 Jd.
631d.
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claims the precise causes of mental disorders are unknown. 64 Whitaker
asserts that psychiatrists embraced the chemical imbalance theory of
mental disorders "because it 'set the stage' for them to 'become real
doctors. '" As doctors of internal medicine had their antibiotics, "now
psychiatrists could have their 'anti-disease' pills toO."65
Whitaker similarly cites studies suggesting that anti-psychotic
medication may have a negative impact on the overall course of the
illness and might cause a worsening of the illness. 66 Whitaker cites a
number of studies that refute the notion that drugs fix chemical
imbalances in the brain.67 Whitaker believes that psychiatry grossly
exaggerates the value of new drugs, silences critics, and keeps the story
of poor long-term outcomes hidden. His goal is to break up the
psychiatry and drug company partnership that seeks to expand the
market for psychiatric drugs. 68
There is a growing chorus of voices ringing the iatrogenic process
bell, claiming that doctors, through their choice of medical treatment,
inadvertently induce the disease of mental illness. Yale psychiatrist
Thomas McGlashan wondered whether anti psychotics were making
patients "more biologically vulnerable to psychosis" and asked whether
the cure was worse than the disease. 69 Whitaker points to a study
demonstrating that patients with schizophrenia had long-term recovery
rates of 40% off medication and only 28% suffered from psychotic
symptoms. In contrast, only 5% of those taking anti-psychotic
medication were in recovery and 64% were actively psychotic. 70 Another
alarming statistic is the skyrocketing growth in population of persons
diagnosed with schizophrenia in psychiatric hospitals between 1955 and
2008. The study blamed the fourfold increase on drug treatment,
coinciding with the arrival of the medication Thorazine. 71
Whitaker warns that antipsychotic medication may actually make
some patients with diagnoses of schizophrenia more vulnerable to future
relapses than would be the case in the natural course of the illness.72
Whitaker asserts that drugs were increasing the likelihood that a person
who suffered a psychotic break would become chronically ill. 73 He goes
on to say that initial exposure to neuroleptics puts patients on a path to
64 WHITAKER, supra note 53, at 332.
65Id. at 78.
66Id. at 191.
67/d. at 307-09.
68 Id. at 334.
69 Id. at 114.
70Id. at 115-16.
71 Id. at 120.
72 Id. at 104.
73Id.
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lifelong drug dependence 74 and relapse suffered by patients withdrawn
from antipsychotics was drug-related and not the result of the return of
the disease. 75 Swedish physician Lars Martensson agreed in 1984 at the
World Federation of Mental Health Conference in Copenhagen, stating
that "the use of neuroleptics is a trap ... it is like having a psychosisinducing agent built into the brain. "76
Whitaker has put the spotlight on the need to reexamine the misuse
of medication in the treatment of persons with mental illness. Advocates
should push the dialogue to alternative forms of non-drug treatment
options and recognize the limits of medication in the treatment of mental
illness. States should repeal and courts should overturn the "grave
disability" and "need of treatment" standards. Advocates should demand
that concrete and specific evidence of current dangerous behavior be the
only admissible evidence used to support civil commitments. Judges
presented with persons with mental illness facing civil commitment
should be open minded and willing to understand the reasons for
medication noncompliance. Judges should appreciate that not all people
with mental illness who refuse their medication lack insight into their
illness, and that refusal to take one's medicine is not necessarily
emblematic of a dangerous person.
III. CHALLENGES TO PREDICTING DANGEROUSNESS: STATISTICAL
REVIEW AND ANALYSIS OF PSYCHIATRISTS' RECOMMENDATIONS IN
CIVIL COMMITMENT DECISIONS
When psychiatrists are called upon to offer expert testimony at civil
commitment hearings they must explain how the patient's presenting
behaviors support their belief that the patient poses a danger to self or
others and requires inpatient treatment. The factors the psychiatrist
considers in evaluating and predicting whether a person is dangerous are
often debated and discussed; however, most scholars would agree that
such a task is largely speculative. 77 For years, the conventional wisdom
was that clinicians were rather poor at predicting future violence in
individuals with mental disorders. In general, studies showed that
clinicians were right a third of the time in predicting whether an
individual with mental illness would be involved in future violence. The
standard conclusion was that relying on clinical experience was not
appreciably better than flipping a coin.78 According to a clinical study on
Id. at 106.
751d.
76 Id. at 107 (internal citation omitted).
77 Erica Beecher-Monas, Danger at the Edge of Chaos: Predicting Violent
Behavior in a Post Daubert World, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 1845 (2003).
78 Edward P. Mulvey, Assessing the Likelihood of Future Violence in Individuals
with Mental Illness: Current Knowledge and Future Issues, 13 J.L. & POL'y
629, 632 (2005).
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predicting risk of physical violence of patients with psychotic symptoms,
the most significant factor is a past history of physical aggressive
behavior. 79 Furthermore, studies indicate that clinicians vastly
overestimate the incidence of violence in released patients. 8o
To provide empirical data on the views of psychiatrists about the
civil commitment standard in their state and to determine how they
evaluate different evidence in making their decisions, this author
surveyed a diverse group of one hundred psychiatrists from twenty-six
states. 81 The respondents were from a variety of settings, public and
private, inpatient and outpatient, rural, urban, and suburban, with fortythree of the respondents having testified in 100 or more civil
commitment hearings. 82 Twenty-six of the respondents were from states
with a strict dangerous criteria for civil commitment, twenty-six were
from states with a "grave disability" provision, and forty-seven were
from states with a "need for treatment" provision in their civil
commitment laws. 83 The empirical data 84 contained in this Article is
submitted to serve as a backdrop for purposes of illuminating and
comparing the significance that various presenting behaviors of the
mentally ill persons have for psychiatrists.
The survey included a series of questions about how psychiatrists
evaluate whether a person is a danger to self or others. 85 In the first set of

Mario Amore et aI., Predictors of Violent Behavior Among Acute Psychiatric
Patients: Clinical Study, 62 PSYCHIATRY AND CLINICAL NEUROSCIENCES 247
(2008).
80 M. Neil Browne & Ronda R. Harrison-Spoerl, Putting Expert Testimony in Its
Epistemological Place: What Predictions of Dangerousness in Court Can Teach
Us, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 1119, 1174 (2008) (stating that clinicians estimated 50%
to 80% of offenders would engage in a serious aggressive act, the actual rate of
violence was in the 12% to 15% range).
81 See Stone, Survey, supra note 10 (unpublished web-based survey conducted
by the author, original survey on file with author). The survey questions and
answer choices are reproduced infra at Appendix A. The invitations to
participate in the survey were distributed to American psychiatric associations
throughout the country. Survey respondents indicated they practiced in
Alabama, Alaska, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii,
Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New
York, Ohio, South Dakota, Texas, Utah and Wyoming.
82Id.
83 Id. One respondent did not complete demographic information and his
responses are not included in data comparing responses by commitment statutes.
84 Donald H. Stone, Results of Involuntary Commitment Survey of Psychiatrists
(20 II) [hereinafter Stone, Results] (unpublished data on file with the author).
The percentages cited in this Article represent the percentage of valid responses
to each question, which exclude participants who did not respond.
85 See Stone, Survey, supra note 10.

79
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questions, there was a hypothetical about a forty-year-old-patient,
described as carrying a diagnosis of major depressive disorder and living
alone. The psychiatrists were told that during the past two to three weeks
the patient presented with the following behaviors: (1) refusal to attend
group therapy sessions; (2) vague threats to harm neighbor; (3) fired
from job; (4) hearing voices; (5) poor sleeping habits; (6) self-injurious
minor scratches & bruises; (7) decline in activities of daily living
(bathing, dressing, poor hygiene); (8) eating fifty percent of meals; (9)
left food on stove; (10) spoke of feeling sad; (11) refused to take
psychotropic medication; (12) talked about overdosing on aspirin; and
(13) found wandering late at night on the other side oftown. 86
The psychiatrists were asked whether they believed that the patient,
given the evidence, was dangerous. Eighty percent of respondents found
that under these facts there was clear and convincing evidence of
dangerousness to warrant involuntary commitment. 87 Interestingly, a
greater percentage of psychiatrists from states with strict dangerousness
standard found clear and convincing evidence for civil commitment than
the psychiatrists from states with broader standards. 88

Hy'})olth1eticall: Clear and Convincing

Evidence of Dangerousness

Graph 1: Clear and Convincing Evidence of Dangerousness 89

!d. at Hypothetical 1.
!d. at Question 3; see also Stone, Results, supra note 86.
88 Stone, Results, supra note 86 (stating that demographic information used to
compare responses of psychiatrists from states with dangerous standard and
those from states with a grave disability or "need for treatment" provision).
89Id.
86
87
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Graph 2: Breakdown of Response by Commitment Standard90
The respondents were asked to categorize each of the patient's
presenting behaviors as providing (1) minimal support, (2) some support,
(3) strong support, (4) clear and convincing evidence, or (5) being
irrelevant to their finding of the patient's dangerousness. 91 The fact that
the patient was talking about overdosing on aspirin was the most
significant factor to all of the psychiatrists surveyed, with 50%
classifying the statement as clear and convincing evidence of
dangerousness. Ninety percent said it provided strong support or clear
and convincing evidence for their decision.92 The evidence that the
patient had been found wandering late at night on the other side of town
and had left food on the stove was also considered to be compelling
evidence to over 70% of the psychiatrists. 93 Hearing voices, decline in
activities of daily living, vague threats to harm neighbor, and refusal to
take psychotropic medication were also ranked as significant to 50% or
more of the psychiatrists. 94

90

Id.
See Stone, Survey, supra note 10, at Questions 2 and 3.
92 Id.; see also Stone, Results, supra note 86.
93 See Stone, Survey, supra note 10.
94 !d.
91
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Most Significant Behaviors in Psychiatrists'
Evaluation of Dangerousness

Graph 3: Most Significant Behaviors95

The value the individual psychiatrists placed on the highest ranked
behaviors varied depending on the commitment standard of the
psychiatrist's state of practice. 96 The behaviors that were most overtly
dangerous in nature, overdosing on aspirin and threats to harm
neighbors, were ranked as clear and convincing evidence of
dangerousness or strong support by a greater percentage of psychiatrists
from states with the strict dangerous criteria than among the psychiatrists
from states with broader commitment criteria. 97 Conversely, a larger
percentage of the psychiatrists from states with a broader criteria ranked
those behaviors that are less explicitly dangerous, such as wandering late
at night, leaving food on the stove, hearing voices, decline in daily living
activities, and refusal to take psychotropic medication as significant. 98

See id. at Question 2; see also Stone, Results, supra note 86.
See Stone, Survey, supra note 10.
97Id.
98Id.
95

96

Virginia Journal of Social Policy & the Law

342

[Vol. 20:2

Breakdown of the Most Significant Behaviors by
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Graph 4: Most Significant Behaviors by Commitment Standards99

The patient's other presenting behaviors (refusal to attend group
therapy sessions, speaking of feeling sad, and poor sleeping habits) were
considered to provide clear and convincing evidence of dangerousness or
strong support to less than 40% of the psychiatrists. 100

l.east Significant Behaviors to
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Graph 5: Least Significant Behaviors 101
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See id. at Question 2; see also Stone, Results, supra note 86.
See Stone, Survey, supra note 10.
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Given the concerns of many psychiatrists about the danger of
medication non-compliance, it is noteworthy that 98% of the
psychiatrists surveyed indicated that they disagreed with the statement
that "medication non-compliance alone satisfies clear and convincing
evidence of dangerousness.,,102 According to the psychiatrists surveyed,
the refusal to take psychotropic medications is not as significant to
psychiatrists as other behaviors. lo3 They considered six factors more
significant than medication refusa1. 104 The fact that concrete examples of
dangerous behaviors such as wandering late at night, talking about
overdosing on aspirin, and leaving the stove on were more significant in
psychiatrists' recommendations should provide some comfort to mental
health advocates. lOS

Medication Non-Compliance Alone Satisfies
Clear and Convincing Evidence of
Dangerousness.
II I agree with this
stat<!lnl2!nt.

I disagree with thj!:
smt<!lnl!'llt.

Graph 6: Medication Non-Compliance l06

Although the data indicates that psychiatrists do not weigh
medication non-compliance as heavily in predicting dangerousness, a
patient's decision to forego psychotropic medications to treat his mental
illness is still given considerable weight in the determination as to
whether an individual is capable of living safely in the community,
particularly where combined with a past history of dangerous behaviors

102 See id. at Question 8 (showing medication non-compliance alone satisfies
clear and convincing evidence of dangerousness); see also Stone, Results, supra
note 86.
103 See Stone, Survey, supra note 10, at Question 2; see also Stone, Results,
supra note 86.
104 See Stone, Survey, supra note 10.
105Id.
106 See id. at Question 8 (showing medication non-compliance alone satisfies
clear and convincing evidence of dangerousness); see also Stone, Results, supra
note 86.
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when off of medication. 107 Fifty-one percent of the psychiatrists
surveyed ranked the patient's refusal to take medication as either
providing strong support or clear and convincing evidence of
dangerousness. 108 A slightly higher margin of psychiatrists from "need
for treatment" or "gravely disabled" states (53%) found medication noncompliance as significant in their commitment decisions compared with
46% of psychiatrists from states with a strict dangerous criteria. 109

Comparison of Psychiatrists who Ranked
Medication Non-Compliance as Clear and
Convincing Evidence or Strong Support for
Civil Commitment

Disahled 0, Need for
'rteatll1Cllt Standafd

l!I Gravely

Graph 7: Comparison of Medication Non-Compliance llO
Questions 6 and 7 of the survey addressed the weight given to a
patient's refusal of medication where there is a history of medication
non-compliance and violent behavior. III In the second hypothetical, the
patient did not exhibit any physically dangerous behavior but the patient
became non-compliant with psychotropic medication and did exhibit
dangerous behavior six months earlier. After the patient was hospitalized
in a psychiatric facility, he resumed taking medication but went off his
medication again two or three weeks later. 112
A decisive maj ority of psychiatrists (79%) agreed with the statement:
"There are no specific examples of recent dangerous behavior, it is
premature to recommend involuntary civil commitment at this time.,,113
An even larger majority found that there was not clear and convincing
evidence of danger to self or others, with only 12% believing that the
107 See Stone, Survey, supra note 10, at Question 2; see also Stone, Results,
supra note 86.
108 See Stone, Survey, supra note 10.
109Id.
110 Id.;

see also Stone, Results, supra note 86.

111 See Stone, Survey, supra note 10, at Questions 6 and 7.
112
113

!d. at Hypothetical 2.
See id. at Question 6; see also Stone, Results, supra note 86.
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facts met that level of evidence of danger to self or others. 114 The
different standards for civil commitment explain the variance. Some
states do not require recent dangerous behavior to civilly commit
someone. In those places, the state can use civil commitment as a
preventive measure.
Hypo 2: "Since There are No Specific Examples of
Recent Dangerous Behavior,. it is Premature to
Recommend Involuntary Civil Commitment at this
Time."

I agl'C0 with tbis statemenL

with this statement.

Graph 8: Premature to Commit Where No Recent Dangerous
Behavior115

Hypothetical 2: Clear and Convincing
Evidence of Dangerousness

Graph 9: Clear and Convincing Evidence of Daugerousness116

114 See Stone, Survey, supra note 10, at Question 7; see also Stone, Results,
supra note 86.
115 See Stone, Survey, supra note 10, at Question 6; see also Stone, Results,
supra note 86.
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The weight psychiatrists give to medication non-compliance is
alarmingly higher in states where the civil commitment standard is less
than a strict dangerous criterion. 117 All but one of the psychiatrists who
disagreed with the statement that it was premature to commit came from
states with a need for treatment or grave disability statute.1l8 One
respondent who supported the decision to recommend commitment in
the second hypothetical stated that although "the patient does not exhibit
suicidal or homicidal ideation he is clearly gravely disabled. His
condition can only be expected to worsen if the patient is allowed to
continue without adequate psychiatric care."119 This answer contrasts
with responses from psychiatrists in states with the dangerous criteria. A
psychiatrist from a state with a dangerous criteria, explaining why it was
premature to commit, said that the patient "is at risk for becoming ill and
dangerous, but she is not dangerous now." Another psychiatrist from a
state with a "grave disability" provision cautioned that "psychiatrists
cannot predict future behavior or timing [sic] when a client will
deteriorate" but encouraged the patient to receive community treatment,
accept in home services, and remain medication compliant to prevent
inpatient treatment. 120

Hypo 2: Insufficient Evidence for
Commitment
120%
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116 See Stone, Survey, supra note 10, at Question 7; see also Stone, Results,
supra note 86.
117 See Stone, Survey, supra note 10. Eleven out of the twelve respondents who
answered "yes" to Question 7 were from states with either a "need for
treatment" and/or a "grave disability" provision.
118 [d.
119 Id.
120 !d.
121 See id. at Question 6; see also Stone, Results, supra note 86.
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Hypo 2: Clear and Convincing Evidence of Dangerrousness
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Graph 11: Hypo 2 Clear and Convincing Evidence of
Dangerousness 122

However, many psychiatrists still perceive that their role is to predict
violence and many view hospitalization as an intervention to prevent
persons from deteriorating to the point that they might become
dangerous to themselves or others. A psychiatrist from Missouri stated
that as psychiatrists, "we are held by the public to a higher standard than
law enforcement . . . . [wJe are expected to make reasonable efforts to
foresee and prevent harm."123 Another psychiatrist remarked, "[p Jast
evidence of dangerousness is best predictor of future harm. Success in
prior treatment is good predictor of future success."124 One psychiatrist
so sure of his prediction stated, "HE HAS (sic) OR IS GOING TO
HAVE A RELAPSE."125 This belief that psychiatrists can so easily
predict dangerousness and that forced medical treatment will prevent
future harm is misguided and is in conflict with the reality that
hospitalization and forced treatment are not proven to be successful at
treating mental illness and preventing future harm.
The most scientific predictions of dangerousness are based on
thorough examination, diagnosis of mental symptoms, past patterns of
behavior, and probabilistic assessments; however, these predictions are
still wrong nearly as often as they are right. 126 Given the speculative
nature of predicting dangerousness and the liberty interests at stake,
122 See Stone, Survey, supra note 10, at Question 7; see also Stone, Results,
supra note 86.
123 See Stone, Survey, supra note 10, at Question 6; see also Stone, Results,
supra note 86.
124 See Stone, Survey, supra note 10.
125Id.

126 Charles W. Lidz et a!., The Accuracy of Predictions of Violence to Others,
269 JAMA 1007, 1010 (1993) (recognizing that clinicians are relatively
inaccurate at predicting future violence).
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commitment decisions must be based on concrete evidence of recent acts
or threats of physical violence either to self or others to decrease the
number of false positive predictions.

IV. DANGEROUS TRENDS IN CIVIL COMMITMENT LAWS:

STATISTICAL
ANALYSIS OF EASE OF COMMITMENT AND LENGTH OF STAY

In addition to predictions by psychiatrists being highly speculative
and unreliable, some experts find that the use of clinicians to predict
violence detracts from patients care, interferes with critical decisionmaking, and hampers the administration of justice. 127 In Robert A.
Brooks' survey of 739 members of the American Psychiatric Association
about civil commitment laws, psychiatrists acknowledged the conflict in
the psychiatrist/patient relationship caused when psychiatrists testify in
favor of involuntary confinement, and they indicated that legal coercion
is inconsistent with building a positive therapeutic relationship.128 The
therapeutic relationship between patient and treating psychiatrist is
oftentimes jeopardized where the patient's psychiatrist is called upon to
divulge confidential and protected communications at the civil
commitment hearing in order to prove that the commitment criteria have
been met.
Is the harm to the therapeutic relationship worth the benefits of civil
commitment? Are we better off as a society having laws that make it
easier to confine non-dangerous persons with mentally illness? Studies
indicate that the answer is probably "no."129
According to the MacArthur Risk Assessment, a multidisciplinary
study following more than a thousand individuals discharged from
psychiatric hospitals, violent behaviors are most prevalent following
discharge from inpatient treatment. 130 The study found that most of the
violent behavior occurred shortly after the individuals' discharge from
the hospital. 131 The study revealed that violent incidents dropped off
markedly after about twenty weeks back in the community. 132

127 Robert 1. Simon, The Myth of Imminent Violence in Psychiatry and the Law,
75 U. CIN. L. REv. 631, 643 (2006).
128 Robert A. Brooks, Psychiatrists' Opinions About Involuntary Civil
Commitment: Results of a National Survey, 35 1. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L.
219,225 (2007).
129 The MacArthur Community Violence Study, MACARTHUR RESEARCH
NETWORK
ON
MENTAL
HEALTH,
http://www.macarthur.virginia.edul
violence.html (last updated Feb. 2001).

130Id.
13 1 Id.
132

!d.

Winter 20l2J

Confine is Fine

349

The length of confinement in a psychiatric inpatient facility is rather
short, driven by insurance policies, high costs, and the belief that the
purpose of involuntary confinement is to deal with an acute, emergency
situation. Accordingly, the effectiveness of involuntary confinement in
promoting the long-term wellbeing of a person with mental illness is
questionable and the social stigma attached to being involuntarily
committed is profound. In addition, even if a treatment team is
successful in forcibly medicating a patient within the hospital, it is
common to see the patient refuse to take the psychotropic medication
upon discharge into the community. The revolving door from community
to inpatient hospitalization and back to the community is not an efficient
or effective method of treating persons with mental illness or preventing
future violence.
The push to enhance community-based mental health services is an
important and vital step in humanely treating persons with mental
illness. However, the trend unfortunately appears to be toward increasing
the number of persons eligible for involuntary hospitalization despite
evidence that frequent short-term hospitalizations cause more harm than
good.
A.

DATA ANALYSIS OF TRENDS IN COMMITMENT LAWS AND LENGTH
OF STAY OF CIVIL COMMITMENTS

The Stone Survey asked psychiatrists for their opinions on the ease
or difficulty of inpatient civil commitment in their states and if they have
seen a change in the past five years. The majority of the psychiatrists
(51 %) indicated that commitment laws in their states were about the
same, 26% indicated that it had become more difficult, and 23% said that
it had become easier to commit. 133 Interestingly, a greater percentage of
psychiatrists from states with strict dangerousness criteria found that it
had gotten easier to commit individuals than those from states with
broader criteria. 134

Stone, Results, supra note 86; see Stone, Survey, supra note 10.
See Stone, Survey, supra note 10; Stone, Results, supra note 86 (stating that
29% of psychiatrists in states with strict dangerous criteria and 21 % of
psychiatrists from states with broader criteria indicated that it is easier to
commit people to hospitals than five years before).
133

134
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Psycbiatrists Opinion on Trends in tbe Ease or
Difficulty of Civil Commitment

Graph 12: Ease or Difficulty of Civil
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Graph 13: Breakdown of Ease of Commitment by Standard136
In addition, a greater proportion of psychiatrists who work primarily
in inpatient facilities found that it had gotten easier to commit than those

135 Stone, Results, supra note 86; see Stone, Survey, supra note 10, at
Question 9.
136 Stone, Results, supra note 86; see Stone, Survey, supra note 10, at
Question 9.
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who do not work in such facilities.137 Interestingly, many psychiatrists
expressed that the changes in the ease or difficulty of committing a
person were largely based on outside factors such as the shortages of
beds making it more difficult to commit. 138 Some expressed that the ease
of commitment largely depended upon the jurisdiction and the judges in
the area, with some judges more strict about the criteria and others more
libera1. 139 Some psychiatrists expressed frustration with commitment
laws, lawyers, and judges that they felt sometimes obstructed patients'
ability to obtain needed treatment, blaming the strict dangerous criteria
and "limiting emphasis on the deteriorating mental health condition of
patients" for causing "an undue burden on the mental health professional
in providing the best and appropriate care.,,140

Ease of Civil Comm.itment
(Inpatient vs. Outpatient)
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DifficuII to

About tile same

commi.t

Graph 14: Ease of Commitment (Inpatient vs.
The average length of stay at a nonfederal short-stay hospital for
psychoses in 2009 was 7.5 days overall and 11.2 days for

137 Stone, Results, supra note 86 (giving the demographic information used to
compare responses of psychiatrists who indicated they worked predominately in
an inpatient or outpatient setting, 22% of respondents from inpatient (n=2l)
facilities and 14% of respondents from outpatient facilities (n=59) indicated that
it is easier to commit people to hospitals than five years before. Data from
persons that worked at both equally or left demographic question blank not
included in this data).
138 !d.; see Stone, Survey, supra note 10, at Question 9.
139 See Stone, Survey, supra note 10.
140Id.
141Id.

352

Virginia Journal ofSocial Policy & the Law

[Vol. 20:2

schizophrenia. 142 This marks a decrease in the length of stay from 12.2
days in 1990. 143 In a study of the average length of inpatient stays for
schizophrenia, depression, and bipolar disorder between 1996 and 2000
in Pennsylvania,144 the length of stay decreased for all three conditions
between 1996 and 2000 dropping from 11.3 days to 7.6 days for
depression, 19.0 to 12.7 days for schizophrenia, and 13.9 to 9.4 days for
bipolar disorder. 145 This study found that patients with public insurance
(Medicaid or Medicare) had the longest length of stay and individuals
with HMOs had the shortest. 146
In the Stone Survey, 45% of the psychiatrists indicated that the
length of stay for inpatient treatment is too short, and only 16% believed
that the length of stay is too 10ng. 147 Interestingly, there was a significant
split in opinion about the appropriateness of the average length of stay
between outpatient and inpatient psychiatrists. Not one inpatient
psychiatrist believed that the average length of inpatient treatment is too
long, but 20% of psychiatrists who work at outpatient facilities believed
that to be the case. 148 Most outpatient psychiatrists found that treatment
stays in inpatient facilities were too short, explaining that there were not
enough resources in the community to meet the acute needs of some of
their patients. Many psychiatrists attributed the short stays to fiscal
pressures, blaming insurance companies and bed shortages. 149

142 NAT'L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, NATIONAL HOSPITAL DISCHARGE
SURVEY: AVERAGE LENGTH OF STAY AND DAYS OF CARE - NUMBER AND RATE
OF DISCHARGES BY FIRST-LISTED DIAGNOSTIC CATEGORIES (2009).
143 HEALTHCARE FIN. MGMT. ASS'N, DGA ANALYSIS OF THE NATIONAL
HOSPITAL DISCHARGE SURVEY, 1990-2002 (2005).
144 Jeffrey S. Harman et aI., Profiling Hospitals for Length of Stay for Treatment
of Psychiatric Disorders, 31 1. BEHAV. HEALTH SERVS. & RES. 66, 70 (2004).
145 Id.
146 !d.
147 See Stone, Survey, supra note lO, at Question 10; see also Stone, Results,
supra note 86.
148 See Stone, Survey, supra note 10; see also Stone, Results, supra note 86.
149 See Stone, Survey, supra note lO, at Question lO; see also Stone, Results,
supra note 86.
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Psychiatrists Opinions on the Average
Length of Civil Commitments

Graph 15: Length of Civil Commitments 150
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Graph 16: Length of Stay (Inpatient vs. Outpatient)151
There was also a significant difference in responses between people
who work in public hospitals versus private hospitals, with more

150
151

See Stone, Survey, supra note 10,
See id.; see also Stone, Results, supra note 86.
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psychiatrists in public hospitals finding the length of stay to be too
long. 152

Average Length of Stay
(Public vs. Private Hospitals)
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Graph 17: Length of Stay (Public vs. Private)153
V. RECOMMENDATIONS
Given the liberty interests at stake in civil commitment decisions, it
is imperative that both the commitment laws and actions taken by people
involved in the commitment process ensure the due process rights of
mentally ill persons are respected. For those individuals who have a
mental illness and are in need of treatment, the challenge is to provide
the needed care and treatment in the least restrictive setting appropriate
to meet their needs. The individual's right to be treated in a humane
setting with due process protections should be balanced against the
safety interests of the community.
The following are recommendations to guide state legislatures in
developing and implementing an involuntary civil commitment statute:
1. Require a demonstration of imminent danger of physical
harm to the life ofthe individual or others.
2. Require that imminent danger can only be found where clear
and convincing evidence at the time of the hearing shows
152 See Stone, Survey, supra note 10, at Question 10; see also Stone, Results,
supra note 86 (giving the demographic information used to compare responses

of psychiatrists who indicated they worked primarily in private or public
settings; 20 respondents were from private settings, 75 were from public
settings, and 5 were other and not included in the data reported for purposes of
this question).
153 See Stone, Survey, supra note 10.
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that there is an imminent risk of serious physical harm to the
individual or others.
3. Clear and convincing evidence of dangerousness can only be
concrete evidence of recent actions or threats of physical
harm to self or others. Evidence of recent acts or threats of
emotional harm should not satisfy this requirement.
4. Individuals who are deteriorating but have not yet reached
the level of causing serious physical harm shall not be
subjected to involuntary civil commitment.
5. Establish a policy that inpatient civil commitment should
only be used to deal with persons with mental illness who
are acutely dangerous at the time of the commitment. The
purpose of the commitment should only be to stabilize
patient and return him to the community.
6. Establish as a policy that the lack of medication in and of
itself should never warrant civil commitment without a
showing of clear and convincing evidence of dangerousness.
7. Expand funding for outpatient mental health treatment
servIces.
CONCLUSION

There continues to be pressure on psychiatrists to err on the side of
caution when it comes to recommending inpatient hospitalization.
However, it is shortsighted to believe inpatient hospitalization is a magic
bullet to protect the public from persons with mental illness who are
deemed dangerous. The mistaken belief that medication noncompliance
is an accurate predictor of future dangerous behavior is impeding a longterm solution to addressing the needs of the growing population with
acute mental illness. The watered down "grave disability" or "need for
treatment" standards make it easier to commit individuals but do not
address the long-term care needs of persons with mental illness.
There must be a collaborative approach to fixing the civil
commitment laws and addressing the mental health needs of persons
with acute mental illness. We should all take a collective deep breath and
review the goals of involuntary civil commitment, balancing the need to
protect the individual and community from serious harm and the civil
liberty interests at stake in confining a mentally ill person against his
will. Community-based treatment programs need to be supported and
more fully appreciated. A return to a strict "dangerous" standard,
requiring a showing of imminent danger to self or others, and a focus on
improving the community based mental health services are essential to
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alleviating the shortages of inpatient hospital beds needed to
appropriately treat the population of persons with mental illness who are
considered dangerous. Finally, judges must base their civil commitment
decisions on concrete evidence of dangerous behavior and stop relying
on the psychiatrist's crystal ball prognosis of future deterioration.
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ApPENDIX A: STONE SURVEY

Question 1. Please fill-in the following demographic information:
What is your job title? _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
In what state do you practice? _________________
How would you classifY the area where you practice (rural, suburban
urban)? ____________________________
How many years have you been a psychiatrist?
What type of facility do you practice (public or private)?
What type of patients do you primarily come in contact with (mostly
inpatient, mostly outpatient, both equally)?
How many involuntary commitments have you provided testimony or
evidencein? _________________________
Survey Instructions
Please read Hypothetical 1 and 2. Answer each question based on
your state's standard for in-patient civil commitment of a person with a
mental illness.
In answering the questions below, assume that the patient is Pat
Brown, a 40-year-old patient who carries a diagnosis of major depressive
disorder, lives alone, and you are not currently treating the patient but
are asked to make a recommendation on whether Pat should be
involuntarily committed to an in-patient facility.
Some of the questions in the survey will ask you about the weight
you would give to different factors in deciding whether or not civil
commitment is appropriate. I understand that in practice, your decision is
based on a combination of factors whereby the totality of all factors
determines the outcome. However, for purpose of this survey, I am
attempting to determine the weight you would give to each individual
factor in your decision.
Hypothetical 1
During the past two to three weeks Pat Brown presented with the
following behaviors. Pat has eaten fifty percent of meals, left food on the
stove on three occasions resulting in smoke filling the apartment, has

358

Virginia Journal ofSocial Policy & the Law

[Vol. 20:2

spoken with neighbors about feeling sad and is talking about taking an
overdose of over the counter aspirin. Pat's activities of daily living have
declined over the past two to three weeks, refusing to bathe, dress and
exhibiting poor hygiene. Again, the past two to three weeks, Pat was
exhibiting poor sleeping habits and found wandering late at night on the
other side of town, confused, without a reasonable explanation for being
there. Over the past two to three weeks, Pat has refused to take
prescribed psychotropic medication for the diagnosed mental disorder
and has refused to attend recommended group sessions at a local mental
health clinic.
Additionally, Pat has made a few vague threats to harm the nextdoor neighbor, complaining about loud music. Pat has self-injurious
minor scratches and bruises, and acknowledges hearing voices. In the
past two to three weeks, Pat was recently fired from for excessive
lateness and was referred to you for a consult to determine the
appropriateness of in-patient psychiatric treatment.
Question 2. Please classify the strength you would give to each of the
following factors in deciding whether or not to recommend the
involuntary commitment of Pat to an in-patient hospital or treatment
facility.
Clear and
Convincing
Decline in
activities of
daily living
(bathing,
dressing, poor
hygiene)
Eating 50% of
meals
Refusal to
take
psychotropic
medication
Spoke of
feeling sad
Talking about
overdosing on
..
aspmn

Strong
Support

Some
Support

Minimal
Support

Not
Relevant
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Fired from job
Self-injurious
mmor
scratches &
bruises
Poor sleeping
habits
Hearing
VOices
Found
wandering late
at night on the
other side of
town
Refusal to
attend group
therapy
seSSIOns
Vague threats
to harm
neighbor
Left food on
stove

Question 3. If you were asked to testify in the in-patient civil
commitment hearing of Pat Brown, would you find that there is clear and
convincing evidence of dangerousness to warrant involuntary
commitment?
_ _ Yes, there is clear and convincing evidence of dangerousness.
_ _ No, there is not clear and convincing evidence of dangerousness.
Please explain.
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Question 4. If you answered yes to question three, please indicate which
evidence you gave the greatest weight and which the least?
Most Relevant

Least Relevant

_ _ Decline in activities of daily
living (bathing, dressing, poor
hygiene)

_ _ Decline in activities of daily
living (bathing, dressing, poor
hygiene)

_ _ Eating 50% of meals

_ _ Eating 50% of meals

_ _ Refusal to take psychotropic
medication

_ _ Refusal to take psychotropic
medication

_ _ Spoke of feeling sad

_ _ Spoke of feeling sad

_ _Talking about overdosing on
aspmn

_ _ Talking about overdosing
onaspmn

_ _ Fired from job

_ _ Fired from job

_ _ Self-injurious minor
scratches & bruises

_ _ Self-injurious minor
scratches & bruises

_ _ Poor sleeping habits

_ _ Poor sleeping habits

_ _ Hearing voices

_ _ Hearing voices

_ _ Found wandering late at
night on the other side of town

_ _ Found wandering late at
night on the other side of town

_ _ Refusal to attend group
therapy sessions

_ _ Refusal to attend group
therapy sessions

_ _ Vague threats to harm
neighbor

_ _ Vague threats to harm
neighbor

Left food on stove
Please explain.

Left food on stove
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Question 5. Based on the hypothetical, do you think there are less
restrictive treatment options available that are consistent with the welfare
and safety of Pat?
Yes.
No.
Please explain.

Hypothetical 2
Six months ago Pat became non-compliant with psychotropic
medication, exhibited dangerous behavior, was hospitalized in a
psychiatric facility and upon discharge resumed taking medication.
About 2-3 weeks ago Pat again went off the medication and was brought
before you for an evaluation to determine if Pat should be involuntarily
committed in a psychiatric hospital for care or treatment. At the point of
your evaluation, there are no specific examples of dangerous behavior
being exhibited, however the concern is Pat is again off the psychotropic
medication.
Question 6. Since there are no specific examples of recent dangerous
behavior, it is premature to recommend involuntary civil commitment at
this time.
_ _ I agree with this statement.
_ _ I disagree with this statement.
Please explain.
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Question 7. Based on the facts in hypothetical 2, would you find that
there is clear and convincing evidence of danger to self or others
necessary for the involuntary in-patient commitment of Pat Brown?
Yes.
No.

Please explain.

General Questions
Please answer the following questions based on your perception of
the current involuntary commitment laws and practices in your state.
Question 8. Medication non-compliance alone satisfies clear and
convincing evidence of dangerousness.
_ _ I agree with this statement.
_ _ I disagree with this statement.
Please explain.

Question 9. Over the past 5 years, what is your understanding about the
"ease or difficulty" of involuntarily committing a mentally ill person to
an in-patient psychiatric hospital for care or treatment?
_ _ Easy to involuntarily commit.
_ _ Difficult to involuntarily commit.
About the same.
Please explain.
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Question 10. Over the past 5 years, what is your understanding about
the "length of stay" of those individuals involuntarily confined to an inpatient psychiatric hospital for care or treatment?

_ _ Just right.
_ _ Too long.
Too short.
Please explain.

